Reason and preference

(Note: In one of those annoying moments of (dis?)sycrhonicity I've finished up this post just as Alex has posted his piece below - make sure you don't overlook it! It's not as though I'm that desperate for attention that I need to try and overshadow other people)

According to many people in the field, modern philosophy starts with Rene Descartes, or more specifically with one of the most famous phrases in the history of philosophy: "I think, therefore I am."

Descartes hoped to establish the foundational beliefs of human understanding – to find that which could not be doubted without contradiction. To do this he set aside millennia of accumulated human knowledge and went back to (what he believed to be) the central, unquestionable, truth at the heart of all experience.

I think.
Only that which exists can think.
Therefore, I exist.

However, this is not the fundamental truth that Descartes supposed it to be – it actually presupposes two, quite crucial, things:

1) Reason

Without reason, no argument can be made – or at least no argument worth making.

2) Preference

Without preferences (with which I include desire, value, etc.) there can be no motivation for making an argument.

Descarte (and all sceptics) must assume not only the existence of these two things, but also their validity – as otherwise there are no grounds for making any argument. Without reason, we have no means to, without preference we have no grounds to. This holds regardless of our metaphysics – as metaphysics itself is impossible without them. They are fundamental aspects of our existence and as such largely beyond analysis – once we start to question them our means to and grounds for doing so are pulled from under us: If we question reason, then we cannot construct a rational argument against it. If we question preference, then we have no grounds for preferring it to be valid.

Timmo on Plantinga

ISOHP regular Timmo is currently writing a series of posts on Alvin Plantinga's reformed epistemology over on his own blog. I won't attempt to summarise as, frankly, it's just too difficult. So, part 1 can be found here, part 2 here and the 3rd and final part here.

As an atheist I obviously have issues with Plantinga's argument (as it seems to suggest that I'm probably either delusional, defective or lying about my - lack of - a divine sense), but it's interesting nonetheless.

Argument from (evolved) design

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer, that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer I had before given, that for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. (...) There must have existed, at some time, and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers, who formed [the watch] for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. (...) Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of being greater or more, and that in a degree which exceeds all computation.

– William Paley, Natural Theology (1802)

This is the most famous expression of the “watchmaker analogy”, often used in support of the 'Intelligent Design' “theory” of evolution.

The basic idea is that as we know that certain examples of complexity around us (watches, computers, the faces on Mt. Rushmore) have been designed by intelligent minds we are justified in assuming that examples of complexity in the natural world (the eye, echolocation) were similarly designed.

However, I think that this idea is seriously flawed in its understanding of designed complexity. Concepts such as the watch or computer did not suddenly spring, fully-formed, into the mind of their designer – but are actually as much the result of mutation and natural selection as any biological system. In order to make clear what I mean, I'll provide a rough outline of how I think the modern concept of the watch evolved:

The ancestor of the modern watch was a simple Concept allowing prehistoric man to structure his day more efficiently – probably no more complex than a distinction between earlier, now and later.

The means of replication was language – Man A would express the concept, spreading it to the mind of Man B. During replication, mutations would creep in, partly through errors in communication and partly through the interaction of the Concept with the other concepts found in the mind of Man B.

Some of these mutations would make the Concept less effective, thus making them less useful and (therefore) less memorable and impeding the spread of that variant. Others would make it more effective, thus making it more memorable and useful and increasing the spread of that variant.

Thus, natural selection comes into play – with increasingly complex variants of the Concept vying for a place in the human mind.

Over time, variants of the Concept become increasingly complex and some evolved to take advantage of man's ability to manipulate his environment – leading to the development of increasingly complex timepieces, which, by increasing the exposure to that design, increase the chance of that particular variant spreading into other minds.

Thus, the watch that Paley stumbles across can be seen as a sort of extended phenotype, “designed” to promote the spread of the Concept in the minds of man, and as such would seem to support rather than challenge the concept of evolved complexity.

What do people think?

Quick Question

To anyone who believes in the validity of any of the ontological, cosmological or design arguments for a deity: If such a being wanted us to believe in its existence, why would it only provide evidence that a) can only be properly understood by a small segment of the population, and b) generally only leads to endless debate?

(I realise this might sound a bit glib, but I've been chewing the question over myself for a while now and I'm yet to come up with a decent answer).

The Ontological Argument

(This is hopefully the first in a series of posts going "back to basics")

One of the many “proofs” of God's existence put forward through the years has been the 'Ontological Argument' – an attempt to demonstrate the existence of the divine through logic alone.

Although there have been many versions of the argument, I believe the gist of it can be summarised as:

God is the most perfect being in the universe

The most perfect being in the universe must exist

Therefore, God exists

(This is, admittedly, a rather simplified take on the many versions of the argument put forward by the likes of Anslem and Descartes.)

A number of objections have been put forward against the ontological argument – the strongest being that it's an essentially analytic argument and can therefore provide no empirical facts about the world.

The above argument can be summarised as: The most perfect thing in the universe exists. While this is clearly true (being a tautology) it says nothing about the nature of that thing, which remains an open definition: In a universe consisting of only three beings (Darth Vader, Luke Skywalker and Han Solo, for example) the argument will still hold, as one of those three will be the most perfect being in existence.

Discuss.