Decision-making and rationality

The discussion on the post below is risking becoming a little too broad in my opinion – so I thought I'd try to focus the issue a little (for the time being).

I've stated on various occasions that the main problem I have with the concept of libertarian free will is its vagueness: Human decisions are, apparently, neither causally determined nor random. Yet quite what they are is never fully addressed. To me it seems that not only is LFW unprovable, it's not even describable either.

To this Alex has replied:

Which seems odd to me since you must assume it with every genuine deliberation you make. One would thing a persistent and ongoing experience of a certain phenomena would count for something.

But is this the case?

Does making a decision require that the decision-maker hold some form of LFW? Let's say that I'm faced with the decision of whether to have a final slice of pizza or not: The crucial factor here (all things being equal) is how hungry I am. If I'm hungry enough I will eat the pizza. If not then I won't. This decision doesn't require any grand supernatural view of human nature – it simply requires a dislike of hunger. What about deciding whether or not to buy 'The West Wing' on DVD: The crucial factors (again, all things being equal) are how much I enjoy the show and how much money I have to spare. These factors are determined by biology and environment – We don't choose whether we're hungry or not. We don't choose what we enjoy or get bored by.

The various factors that go into the decision-making process are usually quite numerous, but they all break down into a simple cost-benefit style of analysis. If the pros of joining my friends at the pub outweigh the cost then I'll join them at the pub. If it doesn't then I won't.

Under the determinist conception of decision-making the result is (putting randomness aside for the moment) entirely dependent on the circumstances. If the level of hunger is above a certain point the pizza will be eaten, if below then not. If the temperature outside is too cold then I won't pop out to the shops, if it's not then I will. This is because the individual is rational – they will act in the way that they see as best satisfying their desires (at that moment in time).

Libertarian free will, on the other hand, seems to conflict with this idea of rationality. Let's say there is an individual (Matt) who, being quite hungry, has just spent twenty minutes making dinner. The meal is done and Matt sits down to eat. However, the universe now splits in two: In the first (deterministic) universe, Matt A eats the meal. In the second (libertarian) universe, Matt B does not. Matt A's actions require little explanation, as they're perfectly rational – he was hungry, the food was ready and therefore he ate. Matt B's actions though seem quite odd. There was no reason for him not to eat the food, he simply chose not to. We cannot talk of his decision in rational terms – It was not the case that he wasn't hungry or that he had something better to do (as the cost-benefit analysis can't explain decisions in the Libertarian universe). So his decision must be irrational (yet at the same time meaningful).

As I can't reconcile this with my own experience of decision-making (I do things for a reason) my experience of deliberation provides no support for a non-deterministic theory.

Man and the Machine

There came a day when Man awoke. He was all alone with the machine. From the first day he knew he couldn’t live without it, for outside of the machine there was nothing. This isolation reminded him that, though he was free to explore, his freedom was limited. Whatever he was, he was bound to the machine. As Man pondered this he was assailed by a strange sensation — a deep longing that he couldn’t shake. “From where do I come? Where shall I go? To what shall I live?” And the most puzzling question of all, “What am I?” With these questions in hand Man entered the machine.

It was his hope that within the machine he would find the answers to his questions. With great zeal he began his work. As Man explored, he marveled at the complexity of the machine. At times he was overcome with it’s beauty. He would sit silent for hours just experiencing its wonder. “What does all this mean?” he would ask himself. But no answers were forthcoming.

As Man’s quest progressed he couldn’t help but think that the nature of the machine was such that only something like Man, only much greater, had crafted it. There was much that went on within the machine that seemed impossible if it were not by the work of such a being. For what seemed like an age, Man devoted considerable energy to pondering what such a being would be like and wondering why it created what it did.

With time Man came to see that he could manipulate the machine to achieve his own purposes. This was no small revelation, for now he was able to discover so much more than he had ever dreamed! Bit by bit he brought the machine under his control. With each new advance Man’s knowledge of the machine increased and with each discovery he was stunned by what he found. Phenomena that once seemed almost magical, now appeared to have deeper mechanisms that drove them. Man was so impressed by his discoveries that he no longer felt he needed to postulate a “super-man.” With the abandonment of a creator agency, Man returned to his task, but as he worked the questions he was seeking to answer were starting to feel strangely hollow. Or perhaps it was that the field of answers he had to choose from were now starting to feel a bit more absurd. No matter where he looked, all he found was more machine, more complexity, more noise, but no reason for their existence or workings. As wonderful as the machine seemed to be at times, he could find no point for its existence. It was just there, running on a track between an apparently pointless beginning and an ultimately meaningless end.

The more Man struggled to extract answers from the machine the more it began to lose the beauty he had once seen in it. It was as if the machine mocked him. In all its intractable mystery, it continued on its blind path with no care for the pleadings of the man within it. Frustrated with his attempts to find answers by examining the machine, he traced the long journey back to the place he had first experienced it’s beauty. In desperation he screamed with everything in him, “WHAT AM I?” All his strength gone, he fell to the ground, sobbing. His body shook as waves of anger and despair washed over him. All around him there was nothing but the whirr and click of a machine that took no notice of him.

It was at this time that something caught Man’s attention. A soft glow from deep within the machine flickered through a gap in the floor. Wiping his eyes, he peered between the metal plates. Nothing could have prepared him for what he was about to discover.

Far below him he could see a small monitor nestled deep in a tangle of wires and in it there was an image of himself. It was a birds eye view, as if a camera was positioned directly above him. He looked up, hoping to see what was watching him, but as he did he realized something that wasn’t quite right. The image of himself in the monitor turned and looked towards the ceiling a split second before he did. He turned back and looked into the monitor, then quickly, he turned away. Sure enough, the visage of himself moved before he moved his body. Every move he made the monitor displayed just prior to his enacting it! He would wave his arms or shake his head but his visage would begin it’s movements before he could get his body to react.

He was beginning to think the machine was reading his mind until the video began to gradually speed up. He watched himself peering through the crack, then lift himself off the floor and proceed to sit with his hands in his lap. Apart form a slight swaying from side to side, the image of himself simply sat motionless. This went on for quite some time until suddenly the screen flickered and went dark. Terrified, he lifted himself off the floor and sat up. With his hands lying limp in his lap, Man sat. He felt like he should run, or lift his arms, anything just to prove the video wrong. He could do that couldn’t he? He was a free creature after all... He was the originator of his actions, not the machine... Right? Long hours passed as he sat motionless; his body lost all feeling as the deepest truth he had yet discovered slowly saturated his being.

All this time, even now, this very second, his actions, his thoughts... He had never been controlling the machine; it had been controlling him. Why had he not seen it before? He had no autonomous existence. He was, and always had been, merely a part of the machine. His freedom, his experience—they were all illusory. He had never really been searching for answers to begin with—it had always been the machine. Never Man. Only the machine. In a single moment Man’s existence collapsed.

The machine devoured him, and all was silent.

Our friend Jonathan Jong (aka Revvvvvvvd) on Godpod #28!!!

Where do we begin?

We have spoken often here about how the only indubitable certainty is "that I am experiencing existence". From there our epistemology exhibits a steady downhill trend. Even so, as finite men we have only one option in our search — and that is to begin with ourselves. And here I think is the dilemma that I've been trying to articulate. (with limited success.)

What justifies such a move?

What justification do we have to begin with our own experience? There is only one answer that holds any weight, and It's not atheism. Atheism destroys any justification to begin with ourself. Within atheism the foundation of all reality is an impersonal something. If you start with impersonal something, then man must be reducible to impersonal stuff. To argue otherwise is to say the stream rises above it's source.

My co-blogging friend Matt seems to realize this (at least the first bit) and thus, has accepted determinism. Man is simply part of the machine. But he can't live consistently within such a world view — none of us can. The implications are too destructive. As such, he clings to one last hope: "My life is meaningful because I find it to be meaningful". I empathize with his sentiment here – we all do – but it's an unjustified leap. It's unjustified because it destroys itself when it tries to answer the question I have asked above. "What gives us the right to start with ourselves?"

It all comes down to this word "personal". If, for the sake of argument, we presuppose atheism, then to avoid having the stream rise above it's source, "personhood" must be reducible the impersonal. Suddenly all the attributes that man has historically thought unique to himself (self-determination, the importance of love, the ability to act for 'better' or 'worse') have been destroyed by man's only option: The decent into behaviorism and determinism. Man is just a part of the machine.

One must watch closely at this juncture as all but the most hopeless of men employ some understandably slippery language in the hope of avoiding the implications. You will hear them say things like, "You are making this all sound much worse than it really is. You simply fail to comprehend the incredible potential of the material world!" and "There is no God needed, just look at all the world can do with out him!" Though I truly empathize with such statements, they are irreconcilably flawed. First off, they simply beg the question. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, they make an unjustified optimistic leap. The leap is to desire one's unique personhood in-spite of what must become a reductionist programme in the absence of God. Any attempts to argue otherwise once again have our stream rising above it's source.

I hope I have made the situation clear. It's a desperate place to come to, but if the foundation is impersonal something we are left with no alternative. Now I often have those who are of the atheist persuasion become angry with me at this point. They act as though I have tricked them. There has to be another way... and indeed there is, but before we can consider it we must feel the depth of our plight. If we begin with the impersonal, man is dead. There is no other alternative.

So what other option do we have? "What right do we have to begin with ourself?". There are only two options here an I am convinced that the presupposition of atheism has utterly failed. Let us now consider that which Christianity holds to be truth — that at the center of all reality lies personality. If this proposition obtains we don't have the dilemma of the stream rising above its source. In-fact, personality becomes irreducible altogether. There is an upward rather than downward movement. In atheism we think we know what material is and what it does, thus we are reduced to it. Under Christianity we are only experiencing diffused personality. We cannot fully grasp what it is to be personal. Our ultimate starting point is not blind matter, but a personal God. Our ultimate relationship to reality is not downward, but upward. The mistake of atheism is that it tries to get to know personality by studying corpses.

In the Christian system, beginning with ourself is justified as we are created in the image of God. Like God, we posses a measure of self-determination. Thus, our search is valid because we really CAN search. Also like God, our mind operates according to reason, thus validating our search for unity within the varity. However an important distinction between man and God is that man is finite (and fallen, but that's for another time). Our finite nature makes necessary the 'search' for truth. We don't arrive programmed. We need to look for it. And so, in these ways our most basic task of beginning with ourselves is justified.

One caveat I must add is this: We must here make the distinction between validating the "starting from one's self" and validating the claims of rationalism which stipulate we can achieve final answers using ONLY man, at the exclusion of any revealed religion. This has been the enlightenment project that has died a thousand deaths, but for some reason continues to resurface in the minds of men. If we choose to reject all forms of revelation the result is predictable as the rising of the sun. Unless an unjustified leap of faith is adopted, man is dead. All is arbitrary. We are lost.

As I continue to grapple with these questions I am increasingly confronted with the fact that Christianity, as a system, answers man's fundamental questions like no other philosophy or religion can. It's coherence and correspondence continue to amaze me. Though there are plenty of peripheral questions I continue to do battle with, I am able to live in the comfort of knowing the big ones have answers that satisfy the deepest yearnings of man.

Greg Boyd, ISOHP & Free Will Part 2

A Preliminary Note: Some may be wondering (and Matt has been asking) about the validity of a theory that does not explain how it's central concept works. This should really be no stumbling block however, as we postulate all sorts of theories in this way while attempting to explain observable data. Many of these theories involve mechanisms we are unable to exhaustively explain. So then, if the data we are trying to explain requires the postulation of self-deterining freedom, that is grounds for accepting the theory.

A brief review
In part one we dealt with the scientific objection to Self-determining freedom which asserted that modern science refutes such a notion. What resulted was the exploration of five challenges to the scientific objection. The combined weight of which I see to be severely damaging to the scientific objection.

• The scientific data is inconclusive.
  
• The alternative of determinism destroys any real concept of moral responsibility.
  
• The one who proclaims determinism as truth refutes themselves, for their assertion would also need to be determined, thus invalidating their own truth claim.
  
• Determinism, fails to explain our phenomenological experience as free, morally responsible agents. In-fact, determinism dismisses the phenomenon as illusory.
  
• Practically speaking, determinism is unlivable as an internalized concept. It is unclear how would could genuinely conduct their life under the impression they the had no say in how they reacted to unfolding experiences.

Having dealt with the scientific objection we will now turn our attention to the more challenging objection that self-determining freedom is incoherent.

Caused, or not caused. What's it gonna be?
Perhaps the most potent philosophical argument against self-determining freedom goes a little something like this:

Either a person's decisions are caused or not. If they are caused, then they are determined and thus are not free in an incompatibilist sense. If they are uncaused, however, they still are not free, for, as Kant taught us, an uncaused event is inconceivable. Even if uncaused decisions were conceivable, however, they still would not be free. They would rather be random and capricious. Uncaused decisions could be no more "free" and could possess no more moral quality to them than the involuntary twitching of an eyelash.
Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.68

This seems to set up a strong dilemma for self-determining freedom. As Matt has argued in the past, "either our choices are caused, or they are random". Either choice you pick seems to be a death blow to the position I am arguing for.

a logical analysis
The way Boyd approaches this dilemma is to question the notion that causation is analogous to determination. The above argument only works if, x caused y is equal to x determines y. Logically, it is not clear that this is the case. Boyd argues that our choices do indeed have causes, but this not the same as saying they are determined. All that is needed is retroactive continuity for such an an assertion to hold. Consider the following example:

Imagine you drop a glass bottle onto a concrete sidewalk. Now imagine that God reveals to you a possible world identical ours in every way, yet the bottle, when dropped, does not break.

here we see that, at least logically, we can conceive of a scenario where an action causes an effect, without exhaustively determining the outcome. Keep in mind that all we have shown so far is that there is no logical contradiction in saying that a caused event is not determined. The next question is, can such a situation really be possible in this world?

an evidential analysis
When it comes to "what we are made of" the smallest measurable unites we can observe exist at what is called the quantum level. For the purposes of our discussion, it is interesting to note that a fundamental feature of quantum mechanics deals with the way quantum particles cannot be deterministically predicted. "The only concept of causation that has consistently proven useful at the quantum level is statistical, probabilistic and non-determinative in nature"1. The way a particle may react, given a specific causal conditions can be predicted within a certain range of possibilities, but these reactions have not been shown to be deterministic in nature.

The question must then be asked, if this "openness" at the foundational level of our existence is deemed to be coherent, how is it that the concept of nondeterministic causality becomes incoherent at the anthropological level? This question gains even more force when we remember (as argued above) that we do, in-fact, experience ourselves as free agents. I would argue that the evidence of our own experience, combined with that of the quantum openness we have just discussed, builds a strong case that determinism is false and that the world is better viewed as a, at least partially, open experience in which we do in-fact have some say in the reality that transpires.

Conclusion
Today we have explored the possibility that there is logical and evidential support for the notion that, (at least within a certain range of possible actions) there can indeed exist a certain "openness" where the reality that is brought fourth can indeed, be up to us. It has been argued that the charge, "our actions are either caused or random" need not render self-determining freedom incoherent, for our actions are indeed still "caused", yet they can reasonably be understood to be one option out of a range of possibilities, each of which could have been retroactively coherent.

And so, we conclude this exploration of causality as it relates to free will and determinism. Next up... determinism the concept of sufficient reason. In other words, why one action over another.

1. Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.68

Greg Boyd, ISOHP & Free Will Part 1

For ages now we have been kicking around the notion of "Free Will". I'm not sure where everyone stands on this issue other than Matt and myself. (...well, on second thought, I think I do recall Revvvvvd leaning in the compatibilist direction as well. At any rate...) Matt has decided that he feels the compatibilist stance best coheres with reality as he experiences it. I, on the other hand, have always felt that determinism does violence to the way we experience the world. Still I had never really read much on either side of the debate to have whole lot of confidence in my hunch. Thus, for a time I was left in limbo. I knew that compatibilism seemed untenable, but I had not come across any other concepts that adequately dealt with the free will problem.

I've recently begun reading Greg Boyd's Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil. In usual Boydian fashion Greg picks apart the various positions on this topic in a way that actually made some sense. The following exploration constitutes the beginning of my exploration of this topic. You will see a familiar vein of my own thinking, but I will also be borrowing heavily from Boyd's book. (which is honestly the only serious interaction with the material I have engaged with.)

You will notice that this exploration will be more about deconstructing compatibilism, than it is about describing self-determining freedom. I think this mostly owes to the fact that no one really knows how self-determining freedom works. In much the same way, no one really knows what "matter" is. We only know what it is by what it does. That said, I say we define our terms and dig in!

Self-Determining Freedom

Self-Determining Freedom states that the reason one action is performed verses another is ultimately determined by the agent. This sentiment is captured in the oft heard statement that in order for us to be free we must genuinely possess the ability to have done other than we did in-fact do.

Compatibilistic Freedom

Agents need not be self-determining to be genuinely free. Agents are free if there is nothing that constrains them from doing what they want. But they need not be—and, most would argue, cannot be—free to determine what they want.
Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.58

According to compatibilism, determinism is considered to be compatible with free will. Hence the name. But can this stance be sustained if we are not the originators of the actions in question? Robert Kane argues that unless the agent possesses the power to be the final cause or explanation for their actions, any attempt at rendering them free becomes unintelligible. He goes on to say:

When we trace the causal or explanatory chains of action back to their sources in the purposes of free agents, these causal chains must come to an end or terminate in the willings (choices, decisions, or efforts) of the agents, which cause or bring about their purpose.
Significance of Free will pp.4

"Simply being able to do what one wants does not render one free or morally responsible if the want itself is outside of one's control"1. Boyd uses an illustration that I will paraphrase to illustrate this point.

Imagine I had developed a chip that I could insert into the head of another person thereby controlling their mind. Imagine I put this chip into some random stranger then willed them to carry out a murder. Now, we both get caught and all this evidence comes to light. What judge in their right mind would convict the random stranger who was acting on an impulse that was ultimately my own? Any person viewing this data must conclude that the individual was not free to commit the murder. It is simply absurd to conclude that we can be held morally responsible when the ultimacy of our actions can be traced beyond us to uncontrollable external factors.

It is because of this, that the determinist must declare that moral responsibility has become an illusion. Rather than explaining our experience as morally accountable agents, the compatibilist has simply rendered the phenomenon illusory. It is for this reason that I see the compatibilist attempt at dealing with free will and moral responsibility to be a failure. It set out to demonstrate the compatible nature of determinism and moral responsibility, but in the end it has merely rendered the terms "moral responsibility" and "free will" either neutered of any desirable meaning or illusory altogether.

Compatibilist objections to Self-determining Freedom
Thus far, I hope I have made it clear that the compatibilist position does not seem to be reasonable. Still, many prefer to go this route then to consider self-determining freedom which they see as being either implausible at best, or incoherent at worst. We will now consider two of the main objections to self-determining freedom.

A scientific objection
Many would argue that recent advances in modern science have rendered the concept of self-determining freedom incoherent. Some feel that studies involving the role of genetics and environment on our personality and behavior indicate that personal actions are exhaustively determined by factors antecedent to the agents themselves. In keeping with this line of thinking, they argue that if we had exhaustive knowledge of what made up any given individual as well as exhaustive knowledge of the environment in which the individual was placed, we would then be able flawlessly predict the future actions of the individual. Here again, freedom of the will is considered pure illusion.

Galen Strawson crystalizes this argument:

(1)It is undeniable that one is the way one is as a result of one's heredity and experience. (2) One cannot somehow accede to true responsibility for oneself by trying to change the way one is as a result of heredity and experience. For (3), both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one's success in the attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and experience.

It seems unavoidable that if premise (1) is accepted the logic flows unavoidably from there. Boyd rejects premise (1) then goes on to offer six arguments against it, five of which we will briefly consider.

Inconclusive evidence
"...the evidence supporting genetic or environmental determinism is simply not conclusive ... While empirical evidence proves that genes and environment strongly influence human behavior, this evidence fails to prove that these factors determine our behavior."2.

Determinism and moral responsibility
This argument has already been made above. Essentially, if we are mechanically determined by our genetics and environment then holding people morally accountable for their actions is analogous to punishing someone for the color of their hair or the size of their spleen. It is clear that we do believe people ought to be held responsible for their actions. Thus, this universal belief, ought to constitute one very strong bit of evidence that we do indeed possess self-determining freedom.

Physical determinism is self-refuting
If all known reality is physically determined then the belief "all known reality is physically determined" is also physically determined. The problem here is that it is not at all clear that physically determined conditions are capable of possessing truth values. They simply are. If indeed physical determinism rules the day, all our discussion on this topic is, and always has been, incapable of possessing either truth or falsehood. I think this is what I was trying to get at here, albeit in my typical rather ham fisted way.

Failure to explain the phenomenon of freedom and moral conviction
Also noted above, "if the goal of any philosophical or scientific theory is to render puzzling phenomenon intelligible, then compatibilism must be judged to be a poor theory. Not only does it fail to explain our basic sense of morality, it also fails to explain our phenomenological experience of ourselves as self-determining personal agents. Indeed compatibilism dismisses this as illusory."3. Though it is true that we also experience ourselves as significantly affected by variables outside of our control, (place of birth, biological factors, etc...) it can be equally affirmed that within these externally determined parameters we uniformly experience ourselves as self-determining agents.

Determinism and the pragmatic criterion for truth
This final response the the scientific objection deals with the fact that it is impossible for us to live as though we believe our choices are exhaustively settled prior to our consideration. We can only deliberate about what we genuinely believe to be within our own power. For instance, I cannot genuinely deliberate about whether or not I might spend the afternoon as a chipmunk with x-ray vision. I rightly realize that it's not much of an option for me. On the other hand, I find my day filled with innumerable choices that I genuinely believe to be within my power to deliberate on. It is unclear how a determinist might conduct one's life under the impression that every move they make, every thought they think, has been exhaustively determine for them before they ever entered the scene. This strongly suggests that deterministic views are false, if not meaningless.

In summation
For the sake of making this exploration somewhat bearable to write, let alone to read through, I will now bring part one of this post to a close. So far, I have sought to put forth working definitions for self-determining and compatibilist freedom while voicing my objection to the supposed solution compatibilism brings to the problem of moral responsibility and determinism. I have also reviewed several responses to scientific objections to self-determining freedom. My conclusion, thus far, is that self-determining freedom is not jeopardized, at least as it relates to the supposed scientific objections. Stay tuned for part two when we will be tackling the more difficult philosophical objection that self-determining freedom is incoherent.

1. Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.60
2. Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.63
3. Satan and the Problem of Good and Evil pp.65

Omnipotence and the impossible

(Look at that: you wait ages for a post and then two come along at once. I'd only just knocked this one into shape when I noticed that Alex had posted. Mine suffers from a lack of cute pictures though.)

The most common answer from theists to the problem of evil is the ‘Free Will Defence’, which maintains that it’s logically impossible for God to remove evil and provide free will to humans at the same time – therefore the presence of evil is necessary to achieve a greater good.

On the face of it, this is a perfectly good answer – assuming you accept the libertarian concept of free will*. However, I’d argue that serious problems arise when, as many seem to do, you use the FWD alongside claims of God’s omnipotence. A being cannot be all-powerful and yet unable to do something: an omnipotent being would have to be able to create a world in which we had free will yet in which evil did not exist.

Over on his own blog, Revvvvvvvd argued that asking God to do something illogical was to ask a meaningless question: a 4-sided triangle is just as meaningless as tugimahy a hufquest bubaluyte.

But, in order to worthy of the term omnipotent, I’d say that such a being couldn’t be bound by meaning either: I may not be capable of understanding what I’m arguing, but an omnipotent being would have to – I’d ask it to tugimahy a hufquest bubaluyte, it’d tugimahy a hufquest bubaluyte and in that moment I’d understand. In the same way, although I’m incapable of conceiving a 4-sided triangle (for example), or who libertarian free will could co-exist with the complete absence of evil, an omnipotent being would have to be capable of it. To say that X cannot do Y (whatever Y is) is incompatible with X is omnipotent.

Therefore, while the presence of evil is compatible with a loving God, it surely rules out a loving, omnipotent God?

(*I don’t, but that’s another argument)

Unfounded fears

Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly, as I have said, the wish to feel that you have a kind of elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes. Fear is the basis of the whole thing -- fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of death.
- Bertrand Russell, ‘Why I Am Not A Christian’.

I realise this post could be seen as vaguely insulting, I can only say that it’s not intended to be so.

Reading through some of the comments by theists on the posts below, it seems to me that the same objections to atheism keep reoccurring, objections which put me in mind of the quote which I’ve used to kick-start this post.

I want to try to deal with the three main (as I see it) objections. My apologies for being a little brief, but most of them have been dealt with at great length elsewhere, so this is really just a “summing up”. When I get a chance later I’ll put in links to the bits of the site which deal with them in a more comprehensive manner.

Fear of nihilism: As God is the source of all meaning, without Him we’re condemned to a meaningless, unhappy existence.

Meaning is not, however, something which is external to human existence; it is something which we project onto the world: for an object or situation to be meaningful it simply has to mean something to us. Life is often beautiful, bewildering and intriguing – all things that appeal to me on an intuitive/emotive level – and therefore incredibly meaningful to me (especially considering the only alternative: non-existence).

People all over the planet find life to be more than meaningful without depending on a divine power in any way. The theist may counter that life with god is more meaningful, but then it’s incumbent on them to demonstrate that this is so. (A particularly tricky task, given that it would involve quantifying meaning).

Alex adds:
The misunderstanding here is that you take it that I am saying if there is no God it is impossible for anyone to feel a sense of meaning and we all must live miserable lives. This is of course a silly position to take if one believes there is no God. As you point out quite clearly, we exist and we find things to be meaningful. End of story. Believing there is, or is not a God doesn't change that in the least. It's not even a part of the equasion.

However, there is a subtlety to my argument that I feel must be pointed out clearly. The point I have been trying to make is that without God there is no ground for any of our meaning other than our own personal experience. (It is worth pointing out that modern psychology is working hard to write personal experience out of existence as well.)

So it is not that I see the absence of God as causing the absence of happiness, (to be precise, I would regard the absence of God as the absence of anything) but if we choose to imagine a world that exists without God, I would argue that any meaning that would result from this world would be false and would need to be maintained through self-deception.

Matt rejoins:
If you say that any meaning which doesn't come from a higher source is "false", then yes: humanistic meaning is false. But most non-theists would simply reject that definition. All that is required for something to be meaningful - in a "true" way - is for it to mean something to me. So there's no self-deception involved.

Alex re-rejoins: I will respond to this argument here.


Fear of social collapse: Without God sitting in judgement, people will have no reason at all to be good.

If this were true, we’d expect that the more secular the country the higher the crime rate. Yet, not only is this not true, but some have suggested that the opposite may actually be the case.

The reason that most atheists don’t go on rampages of pillaging and murder is that there’s an incredibly strong pragmatic case for supporting certain notions of right and wrong: ask any random person whether they’d rather live in a society governed by law and order or one in which people were completely free to do what they like and, regardless of their metaphysical beliefs, you’d get an incredibly high percentage going for the former.

The reason for this is that it’s in my own self-interest to live in a society which respects individual rights. Not only am I much safer, and therefore able to achieve more of my goals, but the same applies to those I care about. This is the concept of reciprocal altruism, or, to put it more simply, I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine.

Alex adds:
I must say I am not worried a bit that more "religious" countries have a boatload of social problems. I would be perfectly willing to go along with the charge that "religion" can in fact do more harm than good. Luckily for me I'm not arguing for religion.

I also don't really tend to the fear of social collapse. Most countries that are of a more secular flavor tend to nurture a dishonest view of godlessness. They play down the logical conclusions that are the result of having no God. Even if the bare bones meaninglessness and hopelessness of that ideology were promoted full force, no one would accept it. We are not wired to life lives like that. As you well know we are built to find meaning. We are built to believe that love is true and is the ultimate joy we can achieve in this life.

So again it's not that I so much fear social collapse, it's that without God a societies success depends on how well they maintain their delusion that people have value, that love is true, and that their lives have purpose and meaning.

Matt rejoins:
Again - you're defining things like love and value in a way that most non-theists would reject as pointless. People have "value" if we care about them - which acts on an intuitive/emotional level and has little, if anything, to do with our views on God.


Fear of determinism: If we’re just biological machines, as the theory of evolution seems to suggest, then we’re subject to a strict determinism which obliterates the concept of free will.

This may indeed be true, but religious belief offers only a cheap, and ultimately unsatisfying way out of it.

Whenever I go to make a choice, certain background factors inevitably come into play. If I were trying to choose between two pizzas, then the decision would be made on a number of – fairly predictable – factors such as taste, how much effort I wanted to expend, what I’d recently had to eat, etc. All of which can be seen as determining my choice.

Yet, the existence of a soul, separate from my physical body, does nothing to change this. Unless, of course, we say that God somehow allows us to make choices which, while not determined by our pre-existing preferences, isn’t purely random. But this is a somewhat lazy way out of the problem.

Alex adds:
And now for determinism. First off, I'm not so sure I'm comfortable with the idea of a soul separate from the body. At one point, that was my position, but revvvvd challenged me on that one and I have since done some more reading that has caused that position to be a bit less tenable than it used to be. I would now suggest that we are souls. We are biological bodies, but the trouble comes when we say we are "just" biological bodies. We are body. We are spirit. Different aspects not different substances. Anywho, enough on that.

If, as Matt suggests, This indeed may be true, regarding a strict deterministic world view, how can you live your life without an extreme dose of self-deception? Speaking of laziness, if you were to internalize the concept that you had no free will the level of apathy one would be forced to maintain would be what we now call a type of neurosis. It is impossible for us to have a healthy mental state and truly believe that we have no control over our life, decisions, or actions. To believe that everything will simply be what it will be and we are powerless to affect change of any sort, imparts a feeling of despair that you simply cannot avoid without lying to yourself.

Now the charge that all Christianity has to offer is a cheap, and ultimately unsatisfying way out of it. needs to be demonstrated.

Here's my position: We are created by God. God has told us who He is. He has told us he created us for joy and the fullest of life. He tells us He created us for a love so great we cannot now conceive it. We are free to make our own choices and are responsible for our actions. We are free to affect change in the world for better, or worse. Our thoughts really are our thoughts. They are not simply chemical noise. I can say of my own free will "Matt you are a person I respect and I very much enjoy our conversations."

The deterministic position: We are the product of a mindless explosion. The conditions at this precise moment were determined by the precise conditions at the time of the massive explosion. We are the effects of an uncaused cause. We are complete slaves to the conditions surrounding us. Even our own thoughts are results of causes beyond our control. Our futures are determined, we cannot change it. Matt cannot say, "Alex you are a nice chap.", but the big bang can, not that it really matters since no one is listening anyway.

I don't know about you, but I know which one leaves me feeling unsatisfied.

Matt rejoins:
I didn't say that it was "all Christianity has to offer" - but I've yet to see a convincing theistic argument which demonstrates the existence of the type of libertarian free will suggested here. Either our actions are determined by our preferences (whether God-given or evolved) or they're random.

Free Will, Responsibility, and Openness

Greg Boyd has written an interesting post on his view of free will, openness and moral responsibility over at his blog. In light of our current conversation on free will I just wanted to toss it out for consideration. Greg writes:

to the extent that we deliberate about decisions, weighing the different possibilities before us, we may assume the future is genuinely open. Indeed, we need to presuppose it’s open in order to deliberate about it (which is why I argue that everybody presupposes [and thus unconsciously believes] the open view of the future is true, despite the fact that they may sincerely think it’s false!

Read the entire post here.

Free Will makes NYT

Interesting article here. Then discussed further here. Scott Adams also has yet another post on this topic here.

To get an idea of where these articles are coming from here's a few pertinent quotes.

"A bevy of experiments in recent years suggest that the conscious mind is like a monkey riding a tiger of subconscious decisions and actions in progress, frantically making up stories about being in control."

“If people freak at evolution, etc.,... how much more will they freak if scientists and philosophers tell them they are nothing more than sophisticated meat machines, and is that conclusion now clearly warranted or is it premature?”j

"According to deep mathematical principles, they say, even machines can become too complicated to predict their own behavior and would labor under the delusion of free will."

"Dr. Wegner said he thought that exposing free will as an illusion would have little effect on people’s lives or on their feelings of self-worth. Most of them would remain in denial. 'It’s an illusion, but it’s a very persistent illusion; it keeps coming back,” he said, comparing it to a magician’s trick that has been seen again and again. “Even though you know it’s a trick, you get fooled every time. The feelings just don’t go away.'"

"Dr. Silberstein,... noted that every physical system that has been investigated has turned out to be either deterministic or random. “Both are bad news for free will,” he said. So if human actions can’t be caused and aren’t random, he said, “It must be — what — some weird magical power?” People who believe already that humans are magic will have no problem with that."

I'd have to say if the supernatural is ruled out, I am forced to agree. For any serious scientist with a priori denial of the supernatural the idea of free will must go by the wayside. This is no surprise to me. What does surprise me is when I talk to some of my atheist friends who affirm the truth of their free will yet deny the possibility of the supernatural. If at some point information surfaces that effectively disproves the possibility of the supernatural, I will be first in line to sign up to the theory of our supposed lack of free will. I don't see how we can have it any other way.

The naturalist would say we are comprised of mindless chemicals which are the source of every thought we think and every impulse we feel. By extension that would also have to encompass every 'choice' we think we are making. The very idea that you are 'yourself' is an illusion. The idea that you have control of your body is an illusion.

This raises a question. For most, the idea that we do not have free will would require us to fundamentally change how we view reality. From our birth we have been taught that we are responsible for our actions. We are told we can make good decisions and bad decisions. We are told we are responsible for our actions. If it is indeed true that we do not have free will, what do we do with the entirety of our up-bringing that has embedded in us the idea that we do? This is not just a problem for the theist. Any thoughtful Atheist who is taking the time to read this should consider the implications of this mindset. If we have no free will, everything you believe to be true is pure illusion. You are an illusion.

I have to admit, as a theist, that's a pretty tough pill for me to swallow. I would have to fundamentally change they way I view the world to accept this idea.

A parallel situation occurs for the atheist with regards to the resurrection as articulated here by Matt:

The resurrection, on the other hand, assuming that Jesus went from death to life because he was the son of God, is completely alien to my experience of the world to date, given that on every other witnessed occasion the dead stay dead. Accepting its truth would require me to fundamentally change the way I think about the world - raising the required evidence to an extremely high-level. Even the evidence of my own eyes (which are prone to mistakes) wouldn't be enough.

It's as if Matt is stating exactly my feelings, only I feel them towards the notion that we have no free will.

Though I'm sure there are other options the discussion we have been having so far leads me to this decision: Is is more likely that my life experience has been correct and that we do have free will, thus opening the door to the supernatural. Or is it more likely that my entire life is an illusion and what we can see and test in this universe truly is the whole show.

To accept my problem above we must accept that free will = supernatural. Some will disagree with me. I'd like to hear why.

It would seem that the naturalistic wold view can do nothing but devalue us, whereas Christianity affirms our worth and explains it's reality. I don't mean that to be petty name calling. I mean it simply for what it is. Naturalism affirms there is no God, no objective morality, no objective beauty, love is just chemistry and our free will is an illusion.

I have a hard time with that. I also have a hard time with the possibility that miracles exist. I've never seen an overt "heavens being opened in front of me" kind of miracle. However, just because I have never seen one says nothing of it's possibility. I want to believe that I have free will. I want to believe that love is real and more than 'just' chemicals. I want my life to have meaning, worth and value. From everything I've learned to date Christianity preserves these longings that we all have better than any other system out there.